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From Paper to Electronic: Exploring the fraud risks stemming from the use of 




In recent years, improvements in information technology have caused various 
industries to incorporate technology into their manual systems.2 Technology is 
usually said to provide business sectors with greater ability to store and exchange 
information, improve document management, streamline processes so as to enable 
faster processing leading to a reduction in costs. However technological advances 
have also provided criminals with new ways of perpetrating crime. This paper will 
explore the fraud risks stemming from the use of technology to automate the 
Australian Torrens system. Given the fraud potential afforded to criminals by 
technology, an understanding of these fraud risks is vital in developing fraud 
minimization measures. The approach taken by this paper is as follows: first, a brief 
overview of the methods of fraud perpetration will be provided so as to identify 
factors in conveyancing processes that enable these frauds; secondly, a comparison 
of the electronic systems3 in New Zealand and Canada4 and the systems proposed in 
Australia (the Victorian EC System5 and the National Electronic Conveyancing 
                                                 
1  Lecturer, School of Accountancy, Queensland University of Technology. Email: 
r.low@qut.edu.au . The author would like to thank Mark Burdon and Warren Moyes, Senior 
Advisor to the Registrar-General of Land, Land Information New Zealand, for their helpful 
comments. The author would also like to thank Professor Michael Weir for the opportunity to 
participate in the 2008 Torrens Title Workshop at Bond University and to all workshop 
participants for their informed and helpful feedback. 
2  For example, the Australian Government’s eHealth program uses technology to electronically 
manage health information. It is said that this will help deliver safer, more efficient, better 
quality healthcare. See the Australian Government Department of Health and Aging, eHealth 
(2008) <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/eHealth> at 4 November 
2008. The courts are also increasingly integrating technology into their systems as an aid to 
courtroom litigation and to improve the management of justice sector data. See for example: 
Sheryl Jackson, ‘New Challenges for Litigation in the Electronic Age’ (2007) 12 (1) Deakin law 
Review 81. 
3  For the purposes of this article, electronic systems are systems that allow for a completely 
paperless transaction, from the preparation of land title documents to the lodgement of such 
documents for registration. This article will use the term ‘electronic registration system’ to 
denote this type of land registration system and ‘paper registration system’ to denote land 
registration systems where the registration system has not been automated. 
4  These systems are used in this paper because they are fully operational electronic registration 
systems, as identified in Rouhshi Low, 'Maintaining the Integrity of the Torrens System in a 
Digital Environment: A Comparative Overview of the Safeguards Used Within the Electronic 
Land Systems in Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore' (2005) 11(2) 
Australian Property Law Journal 155.  
5  In 2002, the Victorian Government started its Land Exchange program to enable the exchange 
of land related information and the conduct of transactions via the Internet. One of the projects 
developed by Land Exchange is the Electronic Conveyancing (EC) project which enables 
electronic settlement and lodgement of title transfers and of discharges and registration of 
mortgages. The website for the Victorian EC project is: http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/  
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System or NECS6) will be undertaken in order to identify their common and differing 
characteristics. This comparative analysis will be divided according to the fraud 
enabling factors identified previously; finally, the implications of these common and 
differing features from a fraud risk perspective will then be explored and where 
appropriate, areas for further research will be flagged. 
 
2. Fraud in the Torrens System7 
The most prevalent method of fraud perpetration is forgery of the victim’s signature 
on the mortgage or transfer instrument followed by impersonation of the victim or 
identity fraud8 and misleading the victim into signing relevant documentation. It may 
also be possible to perpetrate fraud by altering a land title instrument after the 
instrument had been executed.9  
 
These methods of fraud perpetration are linked to certain conveyancing processes 
and practices, namely: 
(i) Processes related to execution and witnessing.  
The current practice that instruments that create or transfer an interest must be 
executed by the person creating or transferring the interest, and that the most usual 
method of execution for individuals is the placing of a signature on the instrument, 
means that fraud may be perpetrated by forging the signature of the person entitled 
to create or transfer the interest. For companies, the usual method of execution is to 
affix the company’s seal to the instrument. The fact that this affixing of the seal is 
witnessed by two directors, or by a director and secretary, means that fraud may be 
perpetrated by affixing the seal without the company’s authority and purporting to 
                                                 
6  Unlike the Victorian EC, which is specific to the State of Victoria, NECS is an Australian-wide 
initiative. The website for NECS is: http://www.necs.gov.au/. Articles on the NECS include 
Andrew Perry, 'Building the Home Page' (2005) (262) Lawyers Weekly 16, Alan Davidson, 'The 
National Electronic Conveyancing System' (2006) 26(1) Proctor 33 and Shaun Drummond, 
'Victorian E-Conveyance Should Go National' (2005) (267) Lawyers Weekly 10.  
7  Information in this section is based on Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed 
Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 225. 
8  It is noted that there is an overlap between forgery and impersonation. In impersonation cases, 
the fraudulent person impersonating the victim would still be required to sign as the victim on 
the land title instrument and in that sense the victim’s signature is forged. It could also be said 
that in forging a person’s signature, the fraudulent is impersonating that person. For the 
purposes of this paper, impersonation is restricted to the situation where the fraudulent person 
uses identity documents (including certificate of title) which may be genuine or false to 
impersonate the victim for the purposes of perpetrating the fraud. Hence the main method of 
perpetrating the fraud is the use of the victim’s identity documents, the forgery of the signature 
is incidental. Forgery is restricted to the situation where the fraudulent person simply forges the 
victim’s signature. 
9  Max Locke, Registrar of Titles Queensland Max.Locke@nrm.qld.gov.au email (14 March 
2007). The Registrar noted that the case was resolved by the parties concerned. 
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witness its affixing. Further, since it is possible for an attorney to execute an 
instrument on behalf of the grantor of the power of attorney, fraud may be 
perpetrated by falsifying that power of attorney. 
Witnessing requirements are said to act as a safeguard against fraud, but the 
fraudulent person can circumvent these by forging the signature of the witness 
(which can be of a genuine or fictitious person) or when the witness attests to the 
signatures even though there were not signed in his/her presence.10 
(ii) Processes related to access, preparation, lodgement and examination of land title 
instruments.  
As there are currently no restrictions about  who may prepare and lodge land title 
documents, this means that fraud may be perpetrated by fraudulently altering these 
documents. Anyone with access to these documents that have been prepared and 
executed may perpetrate this fraud. It also means that fraud may be perpetrated if a 
fraudulent person prepares the necessary forms, or obtains them from someone else 
who has prepared them, and misleads or induces the victim to execute them, and 
they are then lodged for registration. 
(iii) Use of the certificate of title.  
Finally, the use of the certificate of title, indicating a right to deal with the land, means 
that fraud may be perpetrated when the fraudulent person is able to produce the 
certificate of title and it is assumed that he or she is the person named on the 
certificate of title and therefore has a right to deal with the land – identity fraud. 
3. Comparative analysis of salient features of electronic systems 
Given that methods of fraud perpetration are linked to access, preparation, 
lodgement, examination, registration, and execution and use of the paper certificate 
of title, the following analysis will be divided into these categories. 
3.1 Access  
3.1.1 Restricted access or open access 
In all the electronic registration systems access to the system is controlled - only 
those who have established their credentials with the system may use the system.11  
                                                 
10  See Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian National Electronic 
Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law 225. 
11  For the New Zealand and Canadian systems, see Rouhshi Low, 'Maintaining the Integrity of the 
Torrens System in a Digital Environment: A Comparative Overview of the Safeguards Used 
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3.1.2 Method of controlling access 
An electronic system’s method of controlling access may be divided into two parts: 
the registration or identification process and the authentication process. The 
registration process refers to the process that prospective applicants must undergo in 
order to be registered as an authorised user of the system. Once the application is 
approved, the user is then able to access the system by logging on to the system. 
The subsequent process after registration is the authentication process. The 
registration process involves a ‘claim or statement of identity’12 whereas the ‘aim of 
authentication is to validate a person’s identity’,13 to verify that claim so as to ensure 
that the user who is seeking access to the system is the same one who originally 
applied to be registered. It is during the registration process that a prospective user 
must provide the system with identification to enable his or her identity to be 
established.14  
 
There are various authentication techniques but they are generally classed into three 
broad categories15:  
• something you have (token-based) such as a smartcard; 
• something you know (knowledge-based) such as a password or PIN or an 
account number; and  
• something you are (biometrics) such as facial image or retinal scan. 
3.1.2.1 Authentication methods 
In Ontario and New Zealand, the authentication method in both systems is a 
combination of ‘something you have’ and ‘something you know’ - access is controlled 
by public key cryptography which requires a token and a password.16 In Ontario, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Within the Electronic Land Systems in Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore' 
(2005) 11(2) Australian Property Law Journal 155. For the NECS and Victorian EC System, 
see National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a National 
Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), [7.3]; 
Department of Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – What is Electronic Conveyancing 
(2008) <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008.  
12  Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Identification and Authentication 
(2006) <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/auth_061013_e.asp> at 1 November 2006. 
13  Stephen Mason, 'Validating Identity for the Electronic Environment' (2004) 20(3) Computer Law 
and Security Report 164, 166. 
14  See Geoff Main and Brett Robson, 'Scoping Identity Fraud' (Attorney General's Department, 
2001). 
15  See: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Guidelines for Identification and 
Authentication (2006) <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/auth_061013_e.asp> at 22 
January 2009. 
16  For these systems, public key cryptography is also the technology used to replace handwritten 
signatures. This is discussed further below. For the purposes of this paper, users who are 
authorised to use the system are termed ‘authorised users’. 
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token is called the personal security package (PSP),17 consisting of a personal 
security profile with an encrypted digital identity and pass phrase, and in New 
Zealand it is the Digital Certificate.18  
 
In contrast to this, British Columbia uses a ‘something you know’ authentication 
mechanism - access is controlled via unique user identifications (usernames) and 
passwords. At the time of writing, it appears that the NECS and Victorian EC System 
will follow the British Columbia pattern.19  
 
3.1.2.2 Registration process 
Whilst all electronic registration systems require its prospective users to undergo a 
form of registration process to obtain access, the process itself differs from system to 
system.  
In both Ontario20 and New Zealand21, each prospective user must undergo a 
registration process where the prospective user’s identity is checked, before access 
is granted.  
However in the British Columbian system and NECS, a type of nomination 
registration process is/will be used. Under this process, an individual authorised by 
an organisation (such as a law firm) wanting to use the system applies for access. 
Once the application is successful, the authorised officer may then nominate other 
individuals employed or contracted by the organisation to be users of the system. 
                                                 
17  See Teranet Inc, Personal Security Package <http://www.teraview.ca/ereg/ereg_PSP.html> at 
22 January 2009. 
18  Land Information New Zealand, Landonline Security 
<http://www.landonline.govt.nz/content/general/security.asp> at 22 January 2009. 
19  See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a National 
Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), [7.4]; 
Department of Sustainability and Environment, EC System Rules Release 3 (2008)  29 
<http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/r_regdocs.html> at 25 November 2008. 
20  Each user must complete a personal security licence (PSL) application form and appear before 
a designated representative (who may be lawyers, notaries, designated land Registry Office 
representatives, designated Teranet representatives and financial institution signing officers) 
whose role is to validate the applicant’s identity. Upon receiving the PSL application form, 
Teranet verifies the application before issuing the applicant with a PSL, upon which the 
applicant can then use the PORTAS website to initialise his/her PSP. See: Teranet Inc, 
Securing Your Information <http://www.teraview.ca/ereg/security_brochure.html> at 20 April 
2006 and Teranet Inc, Teranet Authorized Group Services Form 300 (2006) 
<http://www.teraview.ca/purchase/downloads/Form200.pdf> at 22 January 2009 
21  To obtain a digital certificate to use Landonline, the applicant must complete a proof of identity 
form, providing current proof of identity. The proof of identity form must be certified and mailed 
to LINZ who will verify identity before digital certificates can be issued. See Land Information 
New Zealand, How to Sign-Up <http://www.landonline.govt.nz/content/general/how-to-sign-
up.asp> at 22 January 2009 and Land Information New Zealand, Sign-Up Checklist 
<http://www.landonline.govt.nz/content/signup/what-you-need.asp> at 22January 2008. 
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Using this method, no identity checks are made on each individual prospective user. 
So for example, in the NECS, users are categorised into three broad categories: 
subscribers, users and certifiers22. To become registered as a subscriber, the 
practitioner, or an officer of a business entity authorised to make the application 
(termed authorised officer), must complete an online application form and sign it with 
his/her digital signature certificate23. The authorised user can then nominate others to 
be users of the system.24  
 
3.2 Preparation, lodgement, examination and registration  
In all systems, land title instruments are prepared and lodged electronically.25  
In terms of examination and registration of instruments that have been lodged at the 
Land Titles Office, it appears that both Canadian systems as well as the NECS and 
Victorian EC system26 are/will be limited to the electronic submission of documents 
and do not make provision for any automatic updates of the register. Manual 
intervention by staff of the Land Titles Office in examining and processing the 
electronic document is still required.27  
                                                 
22  Subscribers are corporations, partnerships, associations, government agencies and natural 
persons meeting the minimum requirements for representing clients in using the NECS. 
Subscribers are represented by an authorised officer. The term ‘client’ means registered 
proprietors, vendors, purchasers, caveators, mortgagees, mortgagors and others with interests 
in land or parties to a transaction in land. Users are employees or contractors authorised by a 
subscriber to prepare transaction workspaces under supervision. Certifiers are industry 
practitioners employed by or contracted to a subscriber and authorized by that subscriber to 
certify and sign instruments. See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations 
Description for a National Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic 
Conveyancing Office, 2007), [4.4]. 
23  The manner in which the digital signature certificate may be obtained is discussed further 
below. 
24  For more on the registration process, see National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft 
Operations Description for a National Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National 
Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), [9.1.2.1] – [9.1.2.5]. For the purposes of this paper, 
these individuals who are entitled to nominate other users will be called ‘nominating officers’. 
25  For a general overview of the preparation and lodgement process for New Zealand, Ontario 
and British Columbian system, see Rouhshi Low, 'Maintaining the Integrity of the Torrens 
System in a Digital Environment: A Comparative Overview of the Safeguards Used Within the 
Electronic Land Systems in Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore' (2005) 
11(2) Australian Property Law Journal 155. It is likely that the NECS will be similar to the New 
Zealand system: National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a 
National Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 
2007), [9.25] – [9.26]. In the Victorian system, the electronic workspace is called the 
Electronic Lodgement File (ELF): Department of Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – 
Online Lodgement and Settlement (2008) 
<http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008. 
26  For NECS, see: National Electronic Conveyancing System, How NECS Will Work (2005) 
<http://www.necs.gov.au/default.aspx?ArticleID=50#WHAT%20NECS%20DOES%20NOT%20
COVER> at 5 June 2007. For the Victorian EC System, see Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, Fact Sheets – Online Lodgement and Settlement (2008) 
<http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008. 
27  Rouhshi Low, 'Maintaining the Integrity of the Torrens System in a Digital Environment: A 
Comparative Overview of the Safeguards Used Within the Electronic Land Systems in Canada, 
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This is in contrast to the system in New Zealand where it is possible, depending on 
the category of e-dealing, that upon lodgement of the e-dealing, it is registered 
immediately and the titles register automatically updated without manual intervention 
by LINZ.28  
3.3 Execution and witnessing of land title instruments 
In the systems in New Zealand and Ontario, clients29 no longer physically sign land 
title instruments for lodgement and registration. Rather it is the authorised user with 
signing privileges30 who will sign the relevant instruments electronically lodged for 
registration. This signature by the authorised user with signing privileges is a digital 
signature and is not witnessed.  
To authorise the user to digitally sign the electronic instrument, all electronic systems 
require some evidence of client authorisation. Usually this is evidenced by the client 
signing (handwritten signature) on a client authorisation form and this signature is 
witnessed (also a handwritten signature).31 
                                                                                                                                            
New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore' (2005) 11(2) Australian Property Law Journal 
155, 176. 
28  New Zealand Law Society, EDealing Guidelines (for Electronic Registration) (2008) < 
http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/home/for_lawyers/resources> at 22 January 2009. The categories 
of e-dealing are (1) AUTO REG – automatically registrable e-dealing which is automatically 
registered on submission without manual intervention from LINZ (2) LODGE WITH TEMPLATE 
– lodged e-dealing is manually processed before being registered in Landonline and (3) 
LODGE WITH IMAGE – scanned or attached electronic file to a lodged e-dealing is manually 
processed by LINZ before being registered in Landonline. 
29  The term ‘client’ will be used in this paper to denote those who wish to deal with property. It 
would include registered proprietors, purchasers, mortgagees, mortgagors and any other 
person with an interest in land or a party to a transaction in land. It would also include attorneys 
acting on behalf of the donor of the power of attorney. 
30  The term ‘signing privileges’ refer to authorised users who are able to digitally sign instruments.  
31  In New Zealand, for example, evidence of client authorisation may be provided using a form 
produced by the New Zealand Law Society, called the Authority and Instruction (A&I) Form, 
available from the New Zealand Law Society website at: 
http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/home/for_lawyers/resources. In Ontario, evidence of client 
authorization is provided by a document called the Acknowledgement and Direction form. A 
sample acknowledgement and direction form can be found at Teranet Inc, Acknowledgment 
and Direction <http://www.teraview.ca/resupgrades/downloads/ADR.pdf> at 22 January 2009. 
At the time of writing, both NECS and the Victorian EC also require client authorisation. For the 
NECS see National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a 
National Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 
2007), [9.2.3.3] and National Electronic Conveyancing System, Expert Advice on NECS 
<http://www.necs.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderID=116> at 20 January 2009. The Victorian EC 
client authorisation form is called a representation agreement. See Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – What is Electronic Conveyancing (2008) 
<http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008. 
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3.3.1 Authorised user’s digital signature 
In all the electronic registration systems public key cryptography administered via a 
public key infrastructure (PKI) 32 system is the technology used for digitally signing 
electronic instruments.33 In Ontario, it is called the PSP, in New Zealand, the ‘Digital 
Certificate’ and in British Columbia, the ‘Juricert authenticated digital certificate’. In 
both the NECS and the Victorian EC system, it appears that a Grade 2 Gatekeeper-
compliant Australian Business Number-Digital Signature Certificates (ABN-DSCs) will 
be used.34  
In all systems, users wanting to obtain a digital certificate or PSP35 to digitally sign 
instruments must undergo a registration process. In British Columbia, lawyers or 
notaries apply to Juricert36 who validates the identity and professional credentials of 
these applicants. In the New Zealand and Ontario systems, since the digital 
certificate and PSP is used both to digitally sign instruments and to access the 
system, the process for obtaining the digital certificate/PSP is as described above. 
As for the NECS and the Victorian EC System, the application process for obtaining 
a DSC will depend on the entity issuing the DSC. Generally speaking, for the 
Australian Business Number-Digital Signature Certificates (ABN-DSCs), which are a 
type of Non-Individual Grade 2 digital certificate,37 a 100-point identity verification 
check is required but only the authorised officer of the organisation has to go through 
a personal identification check.38  
                                                 
32  For an explanation of this technology see Sharon Christensen, William Duncan and Rouhshi 
Low, 'Moving Queensland Property Transactions to the Digital Age: Can Writing and Signature 
Requirements Be Fulfilled Electronically?' (Centre for Commercial and Property Law 
Queensland University of Technology, 2002), 51-52. 
33  See Rouhshi Low, 'Maintaining the Integrity of the Torrens System in a Digital Environment: A 
Comparative Overview of the Safeguards Used Within the Electronic Land Systems in Canada, 
New Zealand, United Kingdom and Singapore' (2005) 11(2) Australian Property Law Journal 
155. 
34  National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft National Business Model for the establishment 
of a National Electronic Conveyancing System V.10' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 
2007), [11] and see Department of Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – Digital 
Signing Certificates (2008) <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 
November 2008. Also see National Electronic Conveyancing Office, Expert Advice on NECS 
<http://www.necs.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderID=116> at 20 January 2009 where additional 
advice was obtained on digital signing certification for the NECS.  
35  For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘digital certificate’ is used to describe the instrument 
used to digitally sign instruments in New Zealand, British Columbia, NECS and Victorian EC 
while the term ‘PSP’ used to describe the instrument in Ontario. 
36  Land Title and Survey Authority of British Columbia - Land Title Division, 'Land Titles Electronic 
Filing System (EFS) User’s Guide' (26 July 2006), 31. The Juricert website is at 
http://www.juricert.com/index.cfm. 
37  See Verisign, ABN-DSC Digital Certificate <http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/abndsc-
info.shtml> at 22 January 2009. 
38  See Verisign, Gatekeeper Digital Certificates Overview 
<http://www.verisign.com.au/gatekeeper/overview.shtml> at 22 January 2009. 
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3.3.2 Classes of authorised users entitled to digitally sign instruments 
In all the systems, the class of persons able to digitally sign instruments is restricted. 
In the New Zealand system for example, eDealings may only be signed on behalf of 
their clients by conveyancing professionals.39  
 
In the NECS, only certifiers may digitally sign instruments and in the Victorian EC 
System, subscribers digitally sign instruments created on the Victorian EC System.40 
In British Columbia, any lawyer or notary may digitally sign, so long as the 
lawyer/notary has been Juricert authenticated.41  Thus it appears that for all systems 
solicitors fall within the class of users able to digitally sign instruments. 
3.4 The paper certificate of title 
3.4.1 Use of the paper certificate of title 
In the systems in New Zealand42, British Columbia43 and Ontario44, paper certificates 
are no longer used. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether certificates of title will 
be used in the NECS, as the issue is still the subject of national uniformity 
consultations.45   
 
For the Victorian EC system it appears that, in order to use the EC system, if an 
electronic certificate of title (eCT) does not exist for the land that is the subject of a 
transaction, then the subscriber in possession of the paper certificate of title (pCT) for 
                                                 
39  New Zealand Law Society, EDealing Guidelines (for Electronic Registration) (2008) < 
http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/home/for_lawyers/resources> at 22 January 2009. The EDealing 
Guidelines describes ‘conveyancing professional’ as a practitioner or licensed landbroker. It 
should be noted that licensed landbrokers will soon be replaced by conveyancing practitioners: 
Warren Moyes, Senior Advisor to the Registrar-General of Land, Land Information New 
Zealand wmoyes@linz.govt.nz, email (23 January 2009) and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 
2006 (NZ).  
40  See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a National 
Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), [4.4] 
and Department of Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – Digital Signing Certificates 
(2008) <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008. 
41  Darcy Hammett, Director of Strategic Operations, Land Title and Survey Authority of British 
Columbia <Darcy.Hammett@ltsa.ca>, email (25 May 2006). 
42  Section 18 of the Land Transfer (Computer Registers and Electronic Lodgement) Amendment 
Act 2002 (NZ) prohibits the Registrar from issuing certificates of title for electronic transactions 
land and if land is declared under s25 of the Act to be electronic transactions land, all 
certificates of title for that land are cancelled as from the date on which the declaration takes 
effect. Section 25 of the Act allows the Registrar to declare land to be “electronic transactions 
land” by notice in the New Zealand gazette and such a declaration under this provision was 
published with effect from 14 October 2002: New Zealand Gazette 2002, Issue 150, p3895. 
43  Duplicate titles cannot be obtained for mortgaged land but may be issued for unmortgaged land 
on the written application of its registered owner in fee simple: see Land Title Act RSBC 1996 
s176(1). 
44  See Land Titles Amendment Act 1979 (Ont) ss 32 & 33. 
45  See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft Operations Description for a National 
Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), 
[9.2.6.15]. 
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the land must apply to Land Victoria for the pCT to be converted into an eCT. The 
pCT must be surrendered to the Registrar. The subscriber making the application 
obtains eCT control and this can now be used in the EC system.46  
3.4.2 Use of a client identification process and certifications as to identity 
In some electronic registration systems, instead of requiring production of the paper 
certificate of title as evidence of a right to deal, there is a formal client identification 
process. This is the case in the New Zealand system, where client identification must 
be established when the A&I form is completed and certifications made that 
reasonable steps have been taken to confirm identity.47  It appears that the NECS48 
and Victorian EC49 will follow a similar format to New Zealand.  
 
In contrast, in the Ontario50 and British Columbian51 systems, there is no specific 
requirement for identity verification procedures. Certifications as to identity are not 
required.  
4. Discussion: Implications from a fraud risk perspective  
In this section, implications from a fraud risk perspective arising from the above 
common and differing features will be discussed. Where, due to the scope of this 
paper, it is not be possible to engage in an in-depth discussion of the issues raised, 
they will be flagged for further research. 
                                                 
46  Department of Sustainability and Environment, Fact Sheets – Working with Certificates of Title 
(2008) <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/s_factsheets.html> at 25 November 2008. 
47  Section 164A(3) Land Transfer Act 1952 (NZ). Only practitioners may make certifications: 
s164B Land Transfer Act 1952 (NZ). At the time of writing, s 2 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 
(NZ) defines practitioner as ‘a practitioner within the meaning of s6 of the Lawyers and 
Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ) or a landbroker licensed by the Registrar under s229 of the Land 
Transfer Act 1952 (NZ) but as noted above, licensed landbrokers will soon be replaced by 
conveyancing practitioners. 
48  At the time of writing, it appears that the representative subscriber will be required to verify their 
client’s identity. The precise procedure involved is unclear at this stage as it is the subject of 
national uniformity consultations. See National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Draft 
Operations Description for a National Electronic Conveyancing System V.6' (National 
Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), [9.3.2] and [9.2.3.2]. Also see National Electronic 
Conveyancing System, Expert Advice on NECS 
<http://www.necs.gov.au/default.aspx?FolderID=116> at 20 January 2009.  
49  The identity check will be performed when the representation agreement is completed. 
Subscribers may be verifiers of identity: see Registrar’s Requirements: Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, Electronic Conveyancing – Registrar’s Requirements Release 
3 (2008) 9 <http://www.landexchange.vic.gov.au/ec/r_regdocs.html> at 25 November 2008. 
50  Note that the Law Society of Upper Canada has recently produced a document outlining the 
steps required of a lender in a mortgage or loan transaction to ensure adequate care and skill 
is taken in mortgage or loan transactions. See: Law Society of Upper Canada, Due Diligence in 
Mortgage or Loan Transactions (2008) <http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/jsp/fightingRealEstate/index.jsp> at 
4 November 2008. 
51  The recommendation from the Law Society of British Columbia is for solicitors to obtain some 
sort of picture identification. See Law Society of British Columbia, Real Estate Fraud - A 
Prevention Primer (2005) <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications_forms/iissues/05-
03_risk.html> at 22 January 2009. 
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4.1 Access  
One implication arising from restricted access rather than open access is that it 
potentially improves security by restricting fraud to insiders - those who have access 
to the system. Opportunities to perpetrate fraud by outsiders are potentially reduced 
because they would need to acquire access to the system first before they can 
perpetrate fraud.52 There are two provisos to this conclusion: 
 
First, restricted access as a security measure may only have an effect on some types 
of fraud, not all. Out of the types of frauds capable of being perpetrated – forgery, 
identity fraud, fraudulent alterations and fraudulent misrepresentations, some of 
these require access for fraud to be perpetrated, some do not. For example, identity 
fraud does not require access for the fraud to be perpetrated whereas for fraudulent 
alterations, access will now be required because access is required to alter the 
necessary land title documents. Thus restricting access could mean reduced 
opportunities for fraudulent alterations by outsiders but would not have any effect on 
identity fraud.  
 
Secondly, the potential of restricted access in improving security against fraud 
depends on the strength of the system’s security.53 As noted above, there are various 
methods of controlling access and various ways by which applicants may apply for 
access.  
 
Arguably systems using multi-factor authentication such as a combination of token 
and knowledge based authentication methods will provide greater security than those 
using single factor authentication such as those using usernames and passwords 
(knowledge based) because it means that the fraudulent person must first obtain the 
token, and then guess or ascertain the password, before he or she can access the 
                                                 
52  It was noted by Smith that ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is the ‘most general classification of people 
who could possibly have access to a particular computing system’. Smith classifies insiders as 
‘people with an established relationship with the system’s proprietor. Typical insiders are 
employees of the proprietor’s organization’. Outsiders are classified as ‘people without a similar 
relationship to the organization’: see Richard Smith, Authentication: From Passwords to Public 
Keys (2002), 73. In an electronic registration system, insiders would include employees of 
authorised users of the system (such as solicitors working in a law firm) and employees of the 
system itself.  
53  This type of risk was identified in the risk assessment conducted by Clayton Utz on behalf of 
NECS, that the NECS system security may be inadequate enabling a third party to enter NECS 
(such as by hacking into the system) and change or delete workspace data: see National 
Electronic Conveyancing Office, 'Risk Assessment of the National Electronic Conveyancing 
System' (National Electronic Conveyancing Office, 2007), Volume 3, 23, risk reference 31 and 
risk reference 3. 
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system. In systems using knowledge based authentication methods, all the 
fraudulent person has to do is to obtain the username and password.54  
 
In terms of the registration process, requiring all potential users to go through the 
registration process to gain access where each applicant’s identity is independently 
verified potentially provides better security than a nomination process because in a 
nomination process, the integrity of the process is dependent on the nominating 
officer. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the methods in which the 
registration process including where a nomination procedure is used could be 
strengthened, but this could be the subject of further research.  
 
However to successfully perpetrate fraud in an electronic registration system, the 
fraudulent person must not only be able to access the system, but must also be able 
to digitally sign any instrument prepared on the system. This suggests that it is the 
security surrounding digital certificates/PSPs that is critical as they are used for 
digital signatures. The potential for fraud arising from misuse of the digital 
certificate/PSP is discussed below.  
4.2 Preparation, lodgement, examination, registration 
In all electronic systems, land title instruments are prepared electronically. This may 
make it easier for fraudulent persons with access to the system to perpetrate 
fraudulent alterations, because unlike a physical alteration, an electronic alteration on 
an electronic document will not leave any physical evidence of the alteration.  
 
In the paper system, the practice of the Land Titles Office manually checking 
instruments lodged for registration before updating the register may be said to act as 
a safeguard against this type of fraud, since any alteration of an instrument might 
leave some form of a physical mark which might then be noticed by the officer and 
appropriate action may then be taken. Of course the effectiveness of this safeguard 
depends on the vigilance of the examining officer.  
 
Should manual examinations and manual updating of the register be continued in an 
electronic system so as to continue this layer of security? One view is that automatic 
                                                 
54  See for example, National Research Council (U.S) Committee on Authentication Technologies 
and Their Privacy Implications, Who Goes There: Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy 
(2003) and Christina Braz and Jean-Marc Robert, 'Security and Usability: The Case of the User 
Authentication Methods' (Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 18th International 
Conference on Association Francophone d'Interaction Homme-Machine, Montreal, 2006), 201. 
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registration without manual intervention will make ‘title less secure’.55 Since New 
Zealand is the only system thus far which allows for automatic registration, 
monitoring of that system vis-a-vis fraud claims will be useful in determining the 
effects of removing manual examinations on fraud.  One point to consider here is that 
electronic systems can use technology to improve security and minimise fraud. In 
particular, one feature of public key cryptography technology is that any alterations 
made to a document after a digital signature has been applied to it will invalidate the 
digital signature.56 Thus this feature of technology, together with restricted access, 
may give electronic systems a different, but not necessarily less effective, layer of 
security against fraudulent alterations. The use of PKI technology for digital 
signatures may also enable the system’s administrators to maintain an audit trail of 
those using the system which may assist in tracking fraud.  
 
4.3 Execution and witnessing 
4.3.1 Authorised users digitally signing land title instruments 
It can be seen from the discussion in [3] that in all electronic systems, it will be 
authorised users with signing privileges, and not the client, who will be required to 
digitally sign land title instruments before it can be lodged for registration. This 
arguably presents one of the greatest implications of moving to an electronic system 
– an introduction of a new fraud risk – fraudulent misuse of a digital certificate/PSP to 
digitally sign land title instruments and lodging them for registration.57  
                                                 
55  See Rod Thomas, ‘Fraud, Risk and the Automated Register’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens 
in the Twenty-first Century (2003) 349, 366-367 raising this concern in New Zealand – as the 
New Zealand system allows the register to be updated with any manual intervention. 
56  These features are available in both the New Zealand and Ontario systems. In New Zealand, if 
an e-dealing is edited by anyone after it has been certified and signed, the Landonline system 
clears all certifications and signatures so that the e-dealing must be re-certified and re-signed 
by all parties to the e-dealing before Landonline will accept the e-dealing for lodgement and 
registration: Land Information New Zealand, Landonline E-Dealing Handbook for Students 
(2008) <http://www.landonline.govt.nz/edealing/training-resources/education-
resources/index.asp> at 8 April 2008. Similarly in the Ontario system, any changes made to an 
electronic document after a document has been digitally signed triggers the removal of those 
digital signatures and the document will need to be re-signed by those parties: Teranet Inc, 
Teraview Reference Guide 5.3.3 (2007) 
<http://www.teraview.ca/resupgrades/ru_manuals.html> at 28 April 2008. See also Simon 
Hally, 'How Secure is E-Registration' (2005) 29(7) Canadian Lawyer 47, 47. 
57  Perry in 2003 raised this issue of the security of using digital signatures in an electronic 
conveyancing system proposed for England and Wales: Raymond Perry, 'E-Conveyancing-
Problems Ahead?' (2003) 67 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 215, 218. In Rouhshi 
Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian National Electronic Conveyancing 
System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225 this 
was also identified as a new type of fraud within NECS. 
 14
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in detail how a fraudulent person may 
obtain access to a digital certificate/PSP. Issues to consider here include whether 
and if so how an existing user’s digital certificate/PSP may be ‘targeted’ to perpetrate 
fraud and as an alternative, whether it may be possible for the fraudulent person to 
‘target’ the application process instead in order to obtain a digital certificate/PSP.  
For the former, points to consider include the manner in which the digital 
certificate/PSP is generated, issued, password protected and stored by the user, 
because these impact on the ability of the fraudulent person to gain access to a 
digital certificate/PSP.58 
 
For example, an insecure method of generation and issuance may provide the 
fraudulent person with an opportunity to intercept and gain access to the digital 
certificate/PSP. Unsecure password practices such as disclosing passwords to 
others or re-using passwords for various applications increases the risk of the 
fraudulent person being able to misuse a user’s digital certificate/PSP. The fraudulent 
person may also obtain an existing digital certificate/PSP if the authorised user is 
careless about where it is kept. Thus from a fraud risk perspective, further research 
into how users may be encouraged to adopt secure practices is vital to enhancing 
security.  
 
In terms of the registration process, the strength of the system’s registration 
processes is vital as it assists in preventing fraudulent applications for access and/or 
digital certificates/PSPs59 and helps to ensure that only legitimate users are given 
access and/or issued with digital certificates/PSPs. The reasoning in [4.1] applies 
here. 
 
It is observed that these considerations do not arise in the paper registration system. 
They are unique to an electronic system because of the use of technology to replace 
the handwritten signature. In the paper system, handwritten signatures can be 
                                                 
58  These were also identified in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian 
National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 225 as important points of consideration in terms of preventing fraud 
in the NECS. 
59  This occurred in 2001where VeriSign (a Microsoft product) was tricked by an unknown 
individual pretending to be a Microsoft executive into issuing false digital certificates in 
Microsoft’s name. VeriSign officials assumed responsibility for the mishap, stating that it was 
the failure of the human part of the verification process: John Markoff, Warning From Microsoft 
on False Digital Signatures (2001) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E7DC143CF930A15750C0A9679C8B63
> at 21 January 2009. 
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forged, but there was never a requirement or a need for individuals to keep their 
signatures safe. It is simply not possible. Replacing handwritten signatures with 
digital signatures introduces a new element into the process. And because of the 
potential for fraud whether because the fraudulent person has managed to obtain an 
existing digital certificate/PSP or circumvented the registration process to obtain one, 
the use of digital signatures therefore imposes ‘new’ obligations on users as well as 
the entity responsible for the registration process that do not exist in the paper 
system. The user is now responsible for keeping the digital certificate/PSP safe. The 
entity issuing the digital certificate/PSP is responsible for developing and maintaining 
effective registration processes to minimize the risk of a fraudulent person 
impersonating an authorised user. In fact, attacking the registration process in this 
manner is an additional avenue for the fraudulent person to perpetrate identity fraud 
so that it could be said that in an electronic system, there might be two opportunities 
for identity fraud: (i) identity fraud of the owner of the land and (ii) identity fraud of an 
authorized user of the system. 
 
These additional responsibilities of adopting safe practices and processes also raise 
regulatory and compliance issues which are beyond the scope of this paper but could 
be the subject of future research:  
• should measures, such as best practice guidelines on usages, be 
imposed to ensure safe practices?  
• if so, by whom should they be imposed and how can they be imposed, for 
example, contractually or legislatively?  
• should there be rules or legislation governing liability issues in the event of 
fraud occurring through the carelessness of either party?  
 
In Ontario and New Zealand rules and obligations surrounding the use of digital 
certificates/PSP exist.60 A comparison of these rules and obligations with those 
proposed by the Victorian EC and the NECS will assist in assessing the value of 
such measures and the most suitable manner in which they may be imposed. 
4.3.2 Restricting digital signature abilities to certain authorised users 
In all system, digital signing abilities are restricted to authorised users, and in some 
cases, to specific classes of authorised users. As observed in [3], solicitors are likely 
                                                 
60  These were discussed in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian 
National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 225.  
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to fall within this class. One potential implication from this is that it might provide 
solicitors with a greater opportunity to perpetrate fraud than what they currently 
possess in the paper registration system because in an electronic system: 
• they will have access to the system; 
• they will able to digitally sign instruments on behalf of clients; and 
• their digital signature on the instrument need not to be witnessed.61  
 
So to perpetrate fraud in an electronic registration system, the solicitor would not 
even need to forge the victim’s signature, or mislead the client into signing 
documents, or create false powers of attorney, or fraudulently alter instruments, as is 
the case in the paper registration system. All that the solicitor would have to do would 
be to prepare the instrument, digitally sign it and submit it to the Land Titles Office for 
registration. As noted above, being able to fraudulently use a digital certificate/PSP to 
digitally sign instruments for lodgement and registration is a new opportunity for fraud 
in an electronic system. As seen in the discussion here, solicitors will have the 
greatest opportunity to perpetrate this new type of fraud. 
 
Thus the concern is that in an electronic system, because solicitors play a greater 
role, but without corresponding checks and balances, the system affords them with a 
better opportunity to perpetrate fraud. It is therefore imperative that security 
mechanisms that can be employed to minimise this fraud risk be developed. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss potential security mechanisms of this 
nature but this could be the subject of future research.62 
 
4.3.3 Client no longer signing land title instruments 
In all the electronic systems, clients no longer sign land title instruments for 
registration. Rather an authorisation form is signed instead. This change in practice 
may see a shift in forgery cases – instead of forging the signature of the victim on the 
                                                 
61  This conclusion was also reached in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed 
Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 225. Also see Rod Thomas, ‘Fraud, Risk and the 
Automated Register’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens in the Twenty-first Century (2003) 349 
where Thomas raised similar concerns in New Zealand. 
62  Some of these measures were discussed in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the 
Proposed Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225 in the context of the NECS, such as the use 
of pre-employment screening techniques, monitoring of employees and auditing mechanisms. 
They could be further developed. In addition, the safety mechanism discussed below in [4.4] – 
use of a client ID is also relevant here. 
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land title instrument, fraudulent persons will now have to forge the signature of the 
victim on the authorisation form.  
This coupled with the observation in [4.3.2] that authorised users with digital signing 
privileges will digitally sign land title instruments, show that in terms of forgery of 
signatures, the fraudulent person has a choice in an electronic system - either target 
the client’s handwritten signature on the authorisation form – by manually forging it, 
or target an authorised user’s digital certificate/PSP (as discussed in [4.3.1]).  
It may also see a change in the perpetration of fraudulent misrepresentation. Since 
only authorised persons have access to the system to prepare the relevant land title 
instruments which must be digitally signed before lodgement can occur, it would not 
be possible for fraudulent persons to either prepare for themselves the relevant land 
title instrument or to direct a solicitor to prepare one before misleading the victim into 
signing it. Instead, the fraudulent person would now have to mislead the victim into 
signing the authorisation form.63 
4.4 Non-use of the certificate of title 
The concern in abolishing the paper certificate of title in an electronic registration 
system is that it will result in more identity fraud. When the New Zealand system was 
introduced, Thomas argued that ‘[T]he absence of an outstanding duplicate 
certificate of title (or anything in substitution of the same) is argued to be a key flaw in 
the new system, making it more vulnerable to fraud’.64 
But will this be the case? It is argued that identity fraud might be perpetrated in an 
electronic registration system in the same way as in the paper registration system – 
when the fraudulent person is able to successfully impersonate the victim of the fraud 
to convince the authorised user responsible for the transaction that he or she has a 
right to deal with the land. The difference is that in the paper registration system, 
since the certificate of title is the document used to evidence a right to deal with the 
land, identity fraud uses the certificate of title. In an electronic registration system, the 
manner in which identity fraud may be perpetrated would depend on the system and 
how identity and right to deal might be established. 
                                                 
63  In Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian National Electronic 
Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law 225 [4.2] the conclusion drawn was that in the NECS, this type of fraud will be eliminated 
because subscribers will be digitally signing the land title instrument not the victim. Whilst this 
is true, it may be also possible for the fraudulent person to mislead the victim into signing the 
authorisation form instead and the authorised user accepts the authorisation form believing that 
the victim understands its effects. 
64  Rod Thomas, ‘Fraud, Risk and the Automated Register’ in David Grinlinton (ed), Torrens in the 




For example, if certain types of identity documents, such as driver’s licence or 
passports, are used, identity fraud is possible if:  
• the fraudulent person can obtain genuine identity documents belonging to the 
victim and use them, alone or in collusion with someone else, to impersonate 
the victim; or 
• the fraudulent person is able to falsify identity documents and is able to use 
them, whether alone or in collusion with someone else, to impersonate the 
victim. These falsified documents may be those of a genuine or a fictitious 
person. 
In the Victorian EC System where electronic certificates of title are used in 
conjunction with an identity verification process, the fraudulent person would have to 
circumvent the identity verification process as described above as well as direct the 
authorised user in control of the electronic certificate of title to nominate the 
electronic certificate of title to the transaction.  
 
If, however, a paper certificate of title already existed but has not been converted into 
an electronic certificate of title, the fraudulent person would have to produce the 
paper certificate of title so that it could be converted into an electronic certificate of 
title and nominated to the transaction. The certificate of title and the identity 
documents used for the identity verification process could be genuine or falsified.  
So the requirement that an electronic certificate of title must be nominated to the 
transaction before the transaction can proceed may act as a safeguard against 
identity fraud in the sense that it requires the fraudulent person to take that extra step 
– to either obtain the paper certificate of title so that it may be converted into an 
electronic certificate of title and nominated to the fraudulent transaction or to direct 
the authorised user in control of the electronic certificate of title to nominate it to the 
fraudulent transaction.  
But there may be ways of circumventing this. For example, paper certificates of title 
of other identity documents may be forged. More importantly, as the authorised user 
is given control of certificates of title in electronic format, the need for certificates of 
title will not act as a safeguard against fraud perpetrated by the authorised user; as 
they may simply prepare a transaction, nominate the electronic certificate of title to 
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the transaction, digitally sign it and lodge it for registration. These transactions would 
appear on the face of it to be legitimate transactions.  
 
Hence it is argued that the identity verification process is vital in curbing identity 
fraud.  A paper certificate of title may be one component of this process. If a paper 
certificate of title is not used other identity documents will take its place, so it is still 
the identity verification process that is important, not the document itself. As noted by 
Cocks & Barry: ‘It is the identity of the party that is crucial, not the physical 
possession of the paper title. Fraud is perpetrated when someone impersonates 
another by stealing their identity. Having possession of the paper title is not enough 
in itself, it is simply indicative of identity’.65  
 
An alternative safety mechanism to the certificate of title that has been suggested is 
to issue identification numbers (client IDs) to registered owners of land and to require 
this number to be entered into the electronic transaction before the transaction can 
be accepted for lodgement by the relevant Land Titles Office.66 This may make it 
more difficult to perpetrate fraud, because the fraudulent person would need to know 
the identifier to successfully lodge the transaction. This is similar to using an 
electronic certificate of title, except that in that case, these are in the control of the 
authorised user of the system, whereas it is the registered proprietor who is in control 
or in possession of client ID.  
 
At the time of writing this paper, none of the electronic systems use this safety 
mechanism. This makes it difficult to assess its viability and value as a fraud 
prevention mechanism. Its ability to combat fraud will to a certain extent depend on 
the ability of clients in keeping the client ID safe. Further, it may not prevent fraud in 
situations where the fraudulent person is able to impersonate a client and obtain a 
client ID from the system or in situations where the client shares the ID with the 
fraudulent person.  
The use of client ID also raises other issues including:  
                                                 
65  Russell Cocks and John Barry, 'Electronic Conveyancing: Challenges for the Torrens System' 
(2001) 8(3) Australian Property Law Journal 270, 276. 
66  This safety measure was suggested by Thomas, for the New Zealand electronic land 
registration system. See: Catriona MacLennan, 'Mortgage Frauds Prompt Calls for System 
Changes' (2006) 2 Law News 1. It was also discussed in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud 
in the Proposed Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 
13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225. and in Celia Hammond, 'The Abolition 
of the Duplicate Certificate of Title and its Potential Effect on Fraudulent Claims Over Torrens 
Land' (2000) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 115. Note that this safety measure may also 
assist in minimizing fraud by solicitors (misuse of digital certificate/PSP) as discussed above in 
[4.3.2]. 
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• who should be responsible for assigning these client IDs? 
• when and how should client IDs be assigned? The transmission of the client 
ID to the registered proprietor must be secure, to prevent fraudulent 
interceptions of the client ID; 
• should the client ID be linked to the registered proprietor or to the land? For 
example, if the registered owner sells the property, will the new owner take 
over the client ID of the previous owner or will a new client ID be issued? 
 
This technological option could be further investigated so that a proper assessment 
can be made as to whether it would useful to incorporate this mechanism in an 
electronic system. 
 
The discussion above demonstrates the importance of identity verification 
procedures in combating identity fraud. But its success depends entirely on the 
vigilance of those responsible for verifying identity67 so that it is equally important to 
develop measures to encourage due diligence during the identity verification process. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these in details but issues to look at 
here include: 
• whether it should be left to individual authorised users to formulate 
internal policies and practices in these matters, or whether the system 
should impose a formal process for verification of identity with identified 
best practice guidelines.  
• whether imposing penalties for non-compliance could be another strategy 
for encouraging compliance. If so: 
• what type of penalties may be imposed?; 
• how can these penalties be imposed, contractually or legislatively? 
 
Perhaps one penalty that may be examined is disentitling the party failing to verify 
identity of an indefeasible title. In Queensland68 mortgagees must take reasonable 
steps to verify the identity of the person purporting to sign a mortgage as mortgagor. 
As noted by Weir, these provisions were introduced to ‘create greater discipline in the 
finance industry by punishing lax identification procedures when dealing with persons 
                                                 
67  This point was also raised in Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in the Proposed Australian 
National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 13(2) Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 225. 
68  See ss11A and 11B of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). Indefeasiblity is denied in situations 
where the mortgagee fails to comply with ss11A or 11B and this failure enabled the mortgage 
to be executed by someone other than the true owner: s185(1A) See Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). 
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purporting to be registered owners’.69 The effectiveness of this measure in countering 
identity fraud should be monitored. 
 
Technological advances may also be a contributing factor in the ability of criminals to 
perpetrate identity fraud. Of particular concern are technological advances in 
computer software and hardware which have provided criminals with greater 
capabilities of producing high quality fake or forged identity documents.70 In this 
situation, despite an identity verification process, it will be difficult to prevent identity 
fraud because of the difficulty in detecting whether the identity document is genuine 
or false.  
 
This ability to circumvent identity verification procedures via fake identity documents 
is an indication that to be effective in preventing identity fraud, the problem needs to 
be addressed on a wider, nationwide level, addressing issues such as improving the 
issuance process of identity documents, improving the accuracy of identity 
information held on databases and improving the security features of documents 
used to prove identity.71 
 
Improvements in technology have also resulted in the development of a variety of 
malicious software or malware, such as worms, viruses and Trojan horses that 
criminals can use to capture information. An indication of increases in these types of 
                                                 
69  Michael Weir, ‘Indefeasibility: Queensland style’ (2007) 15(1) Australian Property Law Journal 
79, 79.  
70  This occurred in New Zealand in 2005 where the fraudulent person used fake passports, bank 
statements and tax certificates to convince three lawyers to arrange mortgages over homes 
which the fraudulent person did not own: See Catriona MacLennan, 'Warning About 
Conveyancing Fraud Using False Passports' (2005) (39) Auckland District Law Society Law 
News 1 and Anne Gibson, 'Department Protects Homes From More Fraud', New Zealand 
Herald (Auckland), 2006.  
71  For plastic cards, the technology could include security printing, micro-printing, holograms, 
embossed characters, tamper-evident signature panels, magnetic strips with improved card 
validation technologies and indent printing: Russell Smith, ‘Best Practice in Fraud Prevention’ 
(Australian Institute of Criminology, 1998) 5. Also see Rouhshi Low, 'Opportunities for Fraud in 
the Proposed Australian National Electronic Conveyancing System: Fact or Fiction?' (2006) 
13(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 225; Suresh Cugnasen and David Lacey, 
Identity Fraud in Australia: An Evaluation of its Nature, Cost and Extent (2003); Geoff Main and 
Brett Robson, 'Scoping Identity Fraud' (Attorney General's Department, 2001) and the Australia 
Government’s National Identity Security Strategy: Australian Government Attorney-General’s 
Department, Identity Security (2008), 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Crimeprevention_Identitysecurity> at 12 
January 2008. See in particular the Report to the Council of Australian Governments on the 
elements of the National Identity Security Strategy which identifies and recommends a set of 
security features for proof of identity documents for the purpose of reducing the risk of forgery 
or unauthorised alterations to the documents. Some of these security features include the use 
of watermarks, hidden image and security ink. The document also recognises that 
improvements in biometrics technology may also see biometrics being used for identity 
verification: National Identity Security Coordination Group, ‘Report to the Council of Australian 
Governments on the elements of the National Identity Security Strategy’ (Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2007), 15 & 45. 
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attacks can be seen in a 2006 AusCERT survey which found a rise in Trojan and 
rootkit attacks72 to facilitate identity fraud and reported that the increase in losses for 
online ID theft ‘may represent a changing trend for the worse, along with the 
relatively high levels of trojan related infections reported’.73 This finding accords with 
the prediction of the Australian Crime Commission: that ‘[T]he incidence of high-
tech/cybercrime in Australia is likely to further increase and diversify with a shift 
through third generation to fourth generation technologies and the introduction of new 
internet protocols’.74 
 
Whether these predictions translate to the conveyancing sector, particularly in 
electronic systems where instruments are prepared and lodged online, remain to be 
seen. But it may serve as a warning to those using the system including the system 
administrators that counter measures such as firewalls and encryption techniques 
should be assessed and developed to combat these forms of technological attacks. 
Education and training should also constitute part of this package as it would be 
useless to have technological safeguards without a corresponding understanding of 
how they may be used and/or if users adopt unsafe practices. 
5. Conclusion 
Various jurisdictions have either developed or are adapting technological systems to 
support or replace their paper land registration systems. The impact of this from a 
fraud risk perspective was explored in this paper. By comparing the salient features 
of fully operational, automated registration systems in New Zealand and Canada and 
the systems proposed in Australia, it was found that the extent of fraud risks were 
dependent on the types of features used. Some features, such as using multi-factor 
authentication methods, may provide greater security than single factor 
authentication methods. Any proposals to convert to an electronic registration system 
should first consider carefully these various features and their impact on fraud before 
switching to such a system. Perhaps one of the greatest risk implications identified 
here is that enabling electronic instruments to be lodged upon the digital signature of 
an authorized user potentially provides a new avenue for fraud – fraudulently using 
the digital certificate/PSP. It also raises new requirements that do not exist in the 
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paper system – the need for users and the system to adopt secure practices to 
prevent the fraudulent use of digital certificates. This raises compliance, regulatory 
and liability issues that could be the subject of further research. The fact that 
solicitors are likely to fall within the class of users able to digitally sign instruments, 
lodge and register arguably provides solicitors with the greatest opportunity to 
perpetrate this new type of fraud. Thus in designing measures to prevent this new 
type of fraud, appropriate checks and balances to limit solicitors’ opportunities for 
fraud should also be included. The rise in identity fraud and in particular the ability of 
criminals to use technology to perpetrate identity fraud is a concern. But arguably 
where technology may assist fraud, technology may also be used to prevent or 
minimize fraud. This is one advantage electronic systems have over paper systems – 
electronic systems can utilise technology as a fraud minimisation tool. This is evident 
from the conclusions drawn regarding reduced opportunities for fraudulent alterations 
in an electronic system. Thus the potential of technology in curbing fraud should not 
be overlooked; although as observed in this paper, it may not be effective in 
preventing frauds that occur prior to entry into the system, a prime example being 
identity fraud. But perhaps the greatest consideration identified in this fraud risk 
assessment is the risk of fraud through human frailty – no amount of security will 
prevent fraud if those involved in the system adopt unsafe practices. Hence 
measures to encourage secure practices should be regarded as a vital component of 
fraud prevention, to be developed alongside technology.  
 
 
 
 
